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Abstract 
Since 17 February 2008 - the day of Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
from Serbia - it has become rather pressing to understand whether this act 
has legal precedential value and hence what its consequences are. This 
article carves out the place of secession in international law by appeal to 
fundamental principles and legal doctrine. It also explores major socio-
political aspects in Kosovo’s history, from the battle of Kosovo Polje in 
1389 to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) that set up the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). By following 
these two analytical paths Kosovo is exposed as a case of remedial 
secession and thus as a potential legal precedent. While the elements of 
remedial secession are gathered, it is argued that states deprived this 
instance of practice of its precedential value and made it a legally 
insignificant act. In other words, the international community missed a rare 
opportunity to clarify the concept of remedial secession and to reassert its 
preventive force as a non-traditional human rights protection mechanism. 
A. Introduction 
“It is quite obvious that such a development [the EU’s recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence] would create a serious negative precedent 
from the point of view of international law. It will be seen as a 
precedent by many people, perhaps far too many people, across the 
world.”1 
 
Imperfect as it may be, the focus of the global media may serve as an 
indicator of the priorities of the international community’s agenda, not least 
in what concerns delicate legal issues. Since the mid 1990’s, Kosovo2 has 
been increasingly present in the international media. However, until 2007, 
news about its potential independence and the consequences thereof were at 
best sporadic. This situation changed radically in 2008 along with the 
developments on the ground. The concerns of some states – such as Russia, 
 
1
  Vladimir Chizhov, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the European Union as 
quoted in ‘Russia warns EU over Kosovo recognition’, Financial Times, 7 February 
2008. 
2
  Kosovo as opposed to Kosova will be used throughout the article since it is the term 
used in most English language publications. 
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which spearheads the group of countries rejecting an independent Kosovo 
without the consent of Belgrade, on the basis that it will set a legal 
precedent and fuel separatist movements worldwide – have been duly 
reflected by the press.3 On the other hand, independent media analyses were 
put forward that, on their own volition, pointed to possible secessionist 
implications.4 Not least, as one news title stresses, “breakaway territories 
watch and wait”.5 Leaving aside the sometimes inflated spirit of the media, 
the Kosovo precedent theory is of outmost interest in particular for the legal 
field at least since 17 February 2008, the date of Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence from Serbia. And it remains in the limelight despite, or 
because of, the Advisory Opinion on the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
July 2010.6 Questions related to whether a legal precedent has been created, 
as well as concerning the content and consequences of this possible 
precedent ought to be asked. As suggested by the introductory quote, the 
intensely championed idea is that the Kosovo precedent would revolutionize 
state creation by introducing a right to secession in international law. 
Against this background, the current article is an exploratory study on the 
place of Kosovo’s secession in international law and its potential legal 
consequences for other secessionist movements. It attempts to put forward a 
lucid account of the legal implications of Kosovo’s independence by 
exploring the international regulations on secession, as well as the 
circumstances which led to the case at hand. 
 
3
  For the Russian view on the consequences see ‘Russia warns EU over Kosovo 
recognition’, The Financial Times, 7 February 2008; for the Cypriot and Romanian 
view see ‘Romania and Cyprus confirm opposition to Kosovo independence’, 
EUObserver.com, 7 February 2008. 
4
  For the possible implications of the “Kosovo precedent” in the Balkans: ‘Kosovo: 
Gerechte Grenzen sind nicht zu haben’, Le Monde diplomatique (Swiss edition in Die 
Wochenzeitung), 15 January 2008; in East Asia: ‘Whose problem is it?; Kosovo, 
China and Taiwan’, The International Herald Tribune, 31 January 2008; in the former 
Soviet Union area: ‘If Kosovo goes free; the independence precedent’, The Economist, 
29 November 2007; in other regions: ‘Breakaway regions look to Kosovo precedent’, 
Reuters, 9 December 2007. 
5
  ‘Breakaway territories watch and wait’, Financial Times Deutschland, 25 January 
2008. See also ‘Kosovo’s “inevitable” independence sets important precedent for 
Transdnistria’, The Tiraspol Times, 31 January 2008. 
6
  Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory 
Opinion), 22 July 2010, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf 
(last visited 23 August 2010). 
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The study is constructed as a juxtaposition of theory and practice: an 
inquiry into the legal theory on secession and an analysis of state practice in 
the case of Kosovo. Intuitively one acknowledges that if secession were 
accommodated by international law as a legal modality of state creation, 
then the Kosovo case would not set a precedent as such and any further 
discussion in this direction would be redundant. Once the issue of the 
existence/non-existence of a right to secession is clarified, the socio-
political underpinnings of Kosovo’s independence can be analyzed. These 
research steps will subsequently permit an assessment of the potential legal 
precedent.  
In international law, the notion of precedent has to be regarded within 
the wider framework of creation and change of customary international law. 
International custom as one of the sources of law7 has two constitutive 
elements: state practice and opinio iuris. The latter refers to states acting out 
of a sense of legal obligation, “as to be evidence of a belief that this practice 
is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”8 This 
element permits the distinction between norms and other rules of behavior,9 
or otherwise put “the role of opinio iuris […] is simply to identify which 
acts out of many have legal consequence”10. What becomes evident and 
salient for the current study is that there are different types of acts 
performed by states, not all having relevance in the formation of 
international custom or, in other words, not all having precedential value. In 
the North Sea Continental Shelf judgment, while recalling cases in which 
continental shelf boundaries have been delimitated according to the 
 
7
  Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies the sources of 
international law: “a. international conventions […]; b. international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. general principles of law […]; d. 
[…] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations […]”, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1949, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993.  
8
  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
1969, 3, 44, para. 77 [North Sea Continental Shelf]. 
9
  R. Bernhardt, ‘Customary international law’, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Volume I (1992), 898, 899. See also T. Treves, ‘Customary 
International Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Internationl Law (last 
updated November 2006), paras 11-13, available at 
http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-
9780199231690e1393&recno=1&author=Treves%20%20Tullio (last visited 
24 August 2010). 
10
  A. D’Amato, ‘Trashing Customary International Law’, 81 American Journal of 
International Law (1987) 1, 77, 102. 
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equidistance principle, the International Court of Justice concludes that 
there are several grounds that deprive those acts of weight as precedents.11 
Anthony D’Amato refers to those acts that can create or change customary 
law as “articulated precedential situations”. The term “articulated” implies 
that the state’s act is not merely a behavioral panache, i.e. habit, comity, 
courtesy, expediency, moral requirements, but a legally significant act.12 If 
other states accept an action that is inconsistent with established and 
generally accepted practice then “the action enters into the flow of 
authoritative precedent giving rise to a new practice which is generally 
accepted”13. Similarly in the Military and Paramilitary Activities decision, 
the ICJ found that “reliance by a State on a novel right or an unprecedented 
exception to the principle right, if shared in principle by other States, tend 
towards a modification of customary international law”14. Consent 
expressed by all states of the international arena, while theoretically 
possible, is highly unlikely. Therefore, acquiescence – i.e. silence or 
absence of protest in circumstances which demand a positive reaction15 – 
and protest, understood as a form of communication from one subject of 
international law to another objecting to conduct by the latter as being 
contrary to international law,16 particularly coming from specially affected 
States are essential acts. 
B. Theory: Secession in International Law 
“Not surprisingly, existing States have shown themselves to be 
“allergic” to the concept of secession at all times.”17 
 
 
11
  North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 8, para. 77. 
12
  A. D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (1971), 105, 76, 174. 
13
  O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (1991), 23, 27. 
14
  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. The 
United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, 62, para.109 
[Military and Paramilitary Activities]. 
15
  C. Parry et al., Encyclopedic Dictionary of International Law (1986), 4-5. 
16
  W. Karl, ‘Protest’, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
Volume III (1997), 1157. 
17
  M. Kohen, ‘Introduction’, in M. Kohen (ed.), Secession. International Law 
Perspectives (2006), 1, 3. 
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I. Defining Secession 
A starting point for any attempt to find the definition of secession is 
the recourse to the two Vienna Conventions which deal with state 
succession, as one would normally expect these documents to mention and 
explain the classification of state creation. Unsurprisingly for some 
observers, the Conventions are (symbolically) silent on the topic of 
secession: the preferred formula “separation of parts of a State” does not 
distinguish between a separation made with or without the accord of the 
predecessor state.18 The concept of secession is not an object of agreement 
among the legal scholarship, with different authors interpreting the 
boundaries of the notion in a broader or narrower sense. There are 
significant implications of this lack of uniformity: whereas according to one 
definition a case is considered as secession, according to a narrower 
understanding the same case can be regarded as dissolution.19 In the context 
of state succession, Matthew Craven discusses the problematic aspects of 
the lack of doctrinal consensus on the “schemata of principles to be applied” 
which in turn is translated in dissimilar taxonomies. In other words, the 
definition of secession is dependent on the chosen ordering principle, 
mutual consent or the issue of personality.20 
In line with the above, three streams of interpretation of the meaning 
of secession, differentiated by certain particularities, are prevalent in 
literature. Julie Dahlitz proposed that “[t]he issue of secession arises 
whenever a significant proportion of the population of a given territory, 
being part of a State, expresses the wish by word or by deed to become a 
sovereign State in itself or to join with and become part of another sovereign 
 
18
  Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 23 August 1978 
Art. 34, 1946 UNTS 3; Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State 
Property, Archives and Debts, 8 April 1983, Art. 17, 30, 40, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/3_3_1983.pdf (last 
visited 25 August 2010); M. Kohen, ‘La création d’Etats en droit international 
contemporain’, in J. Cardona Llorens (ed.), Cursos Euromediterráneos Bancaja de 
Derecho Internacional, Volume VI (2002), 590. 
19
  To illustrate the dilemma, appeal to the case of SFRY will be made. Some authors 
consider the independence of the Yugoslav republics to represent instances of 
secession, given that they broke away from Yugoslavia. According to the definition 
employed in this paper the independence of the republics is the result of Yugoslavia’s 
dissolution. The issue of consent is essential; it was Serbia that did not give its consent 
to the independence, however Serbia was not the parent state, but the SFRY. 
20
  M.C.R. Craven, ‘The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States in 
International Law’, 9 European Journal of International Law (1998) 1, 142, 146-147. 
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State.”21 In the view of James Crawford “[s]ecession is the creation of a 
State by the use or threat to use force without the consent of the former 
sovereign”22, whereas Marcelo Kohen sees secession as  
 
“the creation of a new independent entity through the 
separation of part of the territory and population of an 
existing State, without the consent of the latter. […] [also] 
in order to be incorporated as part of another State”23. 
 
The latter definition, while reducing the scope of Dahlitz’ proposal, 
brings with it a critical element – the lack of consent of the predecessor 
state. The import of this particular aspect lies in its profound resonance with 
practice. It is the lack of consent of the parent state that makes secession 
such a disputed topic in international law; it is this factor that gives rise to 
disputes between the predecessor and the newly independent entity, that 
compels the latter to look for legal justifications for its creation 
“elsewhere”24 and hence, it is this that generates the precedent hysteria. The 
lack of consent, as was pointed out, can spark violent disputes, thus it 
appears that Crawford’s qualification – that secession ought to necessarily 
involve the threat or use of force on the part of the seceding entity – is a 
rather double restrictive element. 
Yet another aspect concerning the definitional scope must be 
clarified. Some authors regard the decolonization process as instances of 
secession.25 Martti Koskenniemi, referring to decolonization, asserts that “as 
a matter of international law, secessionism could explain itself as 
compliance – and opposing it as an international crime or possibly a breach 
of a peremptory norm of international law”.26 Arguably, this could be an 
interpretation of Art. 19.3.b. of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility as 
these have been adopted by the International Law Commission on first 
reading in 1980, i.e. “an international crime may result, inter alia, from … a 
serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for 
 
21
  J. Dahlitz, ‘Introduction’ in J. Dahlitz (ed.), Secession and International Law: Conflict 
Avoidance – Regional Appraisals (2003), 6. 
22
  J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed. (2006), 375. 
23
  M. Kohen, supra note 17, 3. 
24
  Id. 
25
  See J. Crawford, supra note 22, 384. 
26
  M. Koskenniemi, ‘National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and 
Practice’, 42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1994) 2, 241. 
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safeguarding the right of self-determination of peoples, such as that 
prohibiting the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial 
domination.”27  
Rosalyn Higgins offers an opposing view to the one above, with an 
argumentation path that echoes the etymological roots of the word secession 
– the Latin verb secedere, se meaning “apart” and cedere “to go”, hence the 
meaning to withdraw.28 Thus, decolonization did by no means imply that the 
people “withdraw” their territory, but that the colonial rulers were the ones 
who had to leave. Another persuasive argument builds on the Friendly 
Relations Declaration, which states that “[t]he territory of a colony or other 
Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and 
distinct from the territory of the State administering it”29. The discussion 
cannot be framed in terms of separation of territories given the existence of 
distinct and separate territories. 
To equate the process of decolonization with a long series of 
secessions would in fact imply that there is consistent state practice that 
admits secession as a legal means of creating new states, which evidently 
would be of outmost relevance for the study at hand. Nevertheless, as 
pointed out above, such an understanding of the decolonization process is 
rather exceptional in legal doctrine and major legal texts appear to speak 
against it. 
 
27
  Draft Articles on State Responsibility with Commentaries Thereto Adopted by the 
International Law Commission on First Reading, January 1997, Art. 19(3)(b), at 105, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_1996.pdf (last 
visited 20 August 2010). As is well known the term “international crime” did not 
make it in the 2001 Draft Articles adopted by the International Law Commission. 
Nonetheless, the term has resonance in Article 40 and 41 of the of the 2001 version. 
Again, it should be underlined that the term secession does not appear in either 
version of the Draft Articles. See specifically footnote 651 of Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001), 
at 113, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (last 
visited 25 August 2010). 
28
  R. Higgins, “Self-Determination and Secession”, in J. Dahlitz (ed.), Secession and 
International Law: Conflict Avoidance – Regional Appraisals (2003), 21, 35. 
29
  GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970 [Friendly Relations Declaration]; Kohen, 
supra note 18, 590. 
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II. Secession and Fundamental Principles of International Law 
A potential right to secession cannot exist in a legal vacuum; 
therefore it is only reasonable to assume a certain interconnectivity with 
general principles of international law. 
1. The Principle of Self-Determination 
Self-determination matured throughout the last three centuries: from 
the seeds planted by the Declaration of Independence of the United States of 
America in 1776, to the principle heralded by nationalist movements during 
the 19th and early 20th century30, to the principle enshrined in Article 1(2) 
and 55 of the UN Charter, and to the right of “all peoples” stipulated by 
Article 1 common to the International Covenants, and finally to a right 
giving rise to an obligation erga omnes as authoritatively interpreted by the 
ICJ in the East Timor judgment.31 Subsequently, in The Wall opinion, the 
Court adopted the “post-colonial view of self-determination”, which does 
not restrict the application of this right to a historic period but looks beyond 
colonialism.32 
The central question for the purpose of the current research is 
whether self-determination and secession cover the same content. One 
author notes the tendency throughout history to condemn secession whereas 
self-determination has gained sympathy, implying further that the difference 
between the two is a difference in name.33 However, not all exercises of 
self-determination involve territorial change. In fact, to non-avisées it is 
rather the internal aspect of self-determination, i.e. the right of the peoples 
to determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and 
 
30
  See D. Thürer & T. Burri, ‘Self-determination’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (last updated December 2008), paras 1-4, available at 
http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-
9780199231690-e873&recno=3&author=Thürer%20%20Daniel (last visited 
25 August 2010). 
31
  East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, 90, 101, para. 29. 
32
  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 
207, 214, paras 28-30. 
33
  L.B. Serapiao, ‘International Law and Self-determination: The Case of Eritrea’, 
15 Issue: A Journal of Opinion (1987), 3. 
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cultural development that is spelled out in the International Covenants.34 
The Covenants and the General Comment 12 of the Human Rights 
Committee on the implementation of the right do not explicitly enunciate 
the external component of self-determination. Nonetheless, the Committee35 
makes unequivocal reference to the consensually adopted Friendly Relations 
Declaration, which indeed lists “establishment of a sovereign and 
independent State, the free association or integration with an independent 
State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a 
people” as modalities of implementing the right to self-determination.36 
Accordingly, the external feature amounts to the freedom of the peoples to 
decide their international status, which in turn includes the option for 
independent statehood. 
One of the crucial aspects of determining the applicability of the 
right to self-determination lies in the long debated concept of peoples. The 
subject of the right to self-determination is notoriously undefined in the 
same documents that proclaim it. It has been UN practice that relied on 
territorial entities with a historical or administrative background, thus 
favoring the formula “un Etat=un peuple”.37 Marcelo Kohen concludes that 
based on this practice “c’est le territoire qui définit le peuple et non le 
contraire.”38 According to this, clearly the first to be recognized as peoples 
are the peoples of states. And in this context the principle of self-
determination does not play the revolutionary role so often attributed to it, 
but contributes to the legitimation of the principles of sovereign equality and 
non-intervention.39 As the Human Rights Committee put it, “States must 
refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other States and thereby 
adversely affecting the exercise of the right to self-determination”40. 
 
34
  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19. December 1966, Art.1, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 173 and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 19. December 1966, Art.1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5. 
35
  General Comments Adopted by the Human Rights Committee, No. 12 – The Right To 
Self-Determination (art. 1) [1984], 134, para. 4, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 [General 
Comment No.12]. 
36
  Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 29. 
37
  G. Alfredsson, ‘The Right of Self-determination and Indigenous Peoples’ in 
C. Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self-Determination (1993), 41, 46. 
38
  M. Kohen, supra note 18, 585. 
39
  J. Summers, Peoples and International Law. How Nationalism and Self-
Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations (2007), 167-170. 
40
  General Comment No.12, supra note 35, 135, para. 6. 
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Operationalizing further the concept of peoples gives one 
incontestable subject: colonial people. As Daniel Thürer and Thomas Burri 
point out based on the jurisprudence of the ICJ “[s]elf-determination […] 
clearly emerged as the legal foundation of the law of decolonization”41. Yet, 
another widely employed category in UN practice are peoples under foreign 
or alien domination. Although this latter category might seem clear-cut, 
once particular cases are being discussed it becomes obvious that consensus 
falls prey to politics.42 Be that as it may, it would be incorrect to equate a 
right to independent statehood of peoples under colonial regime or foreign 
occupation with the right to secession. As was pointed out earlier, the 
peoples in question are not breaking away or separating their territory, but it 
is the colonial power or the occupier that is to leave, which in turn means 
that not all exercises of external self-determination are acts of secession. In 
conclusion, it appears that a potential right of secession resulting from the 
right to self-determination would apply only to people outside the 
decolonization and occupation contexts. 
An example of people outside the decolonization and occupation 
settings which enjoy the right to self-determination and (sometimes) 
expressly to secession are people recognized by states as existing within 
themselves. Some states, albeit few, chose to recognize in their constitutive 
acts peoples, their explicit right to self-determination and even to secession. 
Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution explicitly reunites all the mentioned 
elements.43 Following the model of the Soviet Constitution, the constitutive 
law of Russia recognizes in its preamble and Article 5 (3) peoples with a 
right to self-determination “in the Russian Federation”.44 Famously, the 
1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 
recognized the right of its “nations” to self-determination, which includes 
 
41
  D.Thürer & T.Burri, supra note 30, para. 15. See also Legal Consequences for States 
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports 1971, 16, 31, para. 52; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, 
12, 31, paras 54–59. 
42
  Summers, supra note 39, 169-171. 
43
  See the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Art. 39, 
available at http://www.erta.gov.et/pdf/Constitution.pdf (last visited 25 August 2010). 
44
  Arguably, the qualification ‘in the Russian Federation’ circumscribes the right to self-
determination to its internal aspect, this interpretation however is not evidenced by the 
provisions in the preamble. Constitution of the Russian Federation, available at 
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm (last visited 25 August 2010). 
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also the right to secession.45 Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaims “Bosnian, 
Croats and Serbs as constituent peoples (along with others)”46. Such 
recognition could be interpreted as evidence for a shift from the purely 
territorial definition towards one that accepts nationality or ethnicity as 
differentiation factors.47 
The recently adopted UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People could be said to prove that international law has moved away from 
the enunciated territorial formula. The Declaration proclaims the right to 
self-determination of indigenous peoples, however, proceeds by apparently 
restricting it to the internal component, i.e. “autonomy or self-
government”.48 Despite this clear restriction, several states with 
considerable indigenous populations cautiously rejected the document based 
on “language on self-determination”.49 
2. International Human Rights and Remedial Secession 
The conceptual journey of peoples does not end here. Much rather it 
resembles an odyssey, given, some argue,50 the different theoretical lenses 
one can choose to look at the concept. The ongoing debate revolves around 
whether cultural minorities51 have in certain conditions the right to self-
 
45
  The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Extracts, 1974, in 
H. Krieger (ed.), The Kosovo Conflict and International Law (2001), 2. 
46
 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Preamble, available at 
http://www.ccbh.ba/public/down/USTAV_BOSNE_I_HERCEGOVINE_engl.pdf 
(last visited 25 August 2010). 
47
  On the contrary Marcelo Kohen asserts that the recognition by states of their 
multinational character amounts to “[l]’exception qui confirme la règle’, Kohen, 
supra note 18, 586. 
48
  GA Res. 61/295, 2 October 2007, Art 3, 4. 
49
  UN Department of Public Information, ‘General Assembly Adopts Declaration on 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples; ‘Major Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for All, 
Says President’, available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm (last visited 
25 August 2010). 
50
  Natural law and positivist viewpoints are discussed in R. Lefeber & M. Zieck, ‘Africa: 
Lost between Self-determination and Uti Possidetis’, in C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber & 
M. Zieck (eds), Peoples and Minorities in International Law (1993), 37, 53-54; 
A. Falk, ‘The Coherence of Doctrine Versus the Incoherence of Experience’ in 
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determination, including to the external aspect of self-determination that is 
secession. There have been constant attempts to redefine peoples in non-
territorial terms,52 however, as Aureliu Cristescu confirms in his 
comprehensive study on UN practice, these attempts have not been 
embraced by states. Hence, in his words: “Le peuple ne se confond pas avec 
les minorités ethniques, religieuses ou linguistique.”53 In a recent 
assessment, James Summers notes that “the lack of any positive intention to 
extend self-determination to minorities, at least in a form that includes 
secession” is evident from both the drafting of legal instruments and state 
practice.54 Positivists rightly argue that state practice is scarce and 
conventional legal texts are silent on minorities becoming peoples.55 
While admitting the above, proponents of remedial secession build on 
the momentum of international human rights law and attempt to bridge a 
gap in the legal provisions. As Christian Tomuschat asserts in a powerful 
argument: “States are no more sacrosanct. […] [T]hey have a specific 
raison d’être. If they fail to live up to their essential commitments they 
begin to lose their legitimacy and thus even their very existence can be 
called into question.”56 In other words, respect for human rights has become 
a pillar-principle of today’s world, in addition to the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention in the affairs of other states. And it is this 
general principle that gradually emerged which prohibits gross and large-
scale violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.57 In this 
(modern) context, if a state excludes or persecutes parts of its population, 
then that population might legitimately secede to form a more representative 
government.58 Remedial secession sets a high threshold for those groups 
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invoking the right to secession, since the human rights violations perpetrated 
by the state in discriminatory fashion against the specific group must be 
“grave and massive”59. Consequently, the criterion for acknowledging this 
right is not the mere existence of a people in cultural terms, but the 
existence of grave and massive violations of the human rights of such a 
people. Moreover, remedial secession is an exceptional solution of last 
resort which can be called upon only after all realistic and effective 
remedies for the peaceful settlement have been exhausted.60 Yet, other 
authors add to these the necessity for the cultural group to be concentrated 
and majoritarian on the territory for which it seeks secession.61 
It would appear that what is ultimately proposed by advocates of 
remedial secession – either explicitly or implicitly – is that a cultural 
minority becomes a people only when the high threshold of human rights 
abuse has been reached and when no other remedies are available. By 
becoming a people the right to self-determination is triggered, including in 
its external aspect, thus giving rise to the right to secession. Ultimately, the 
term “remedial” in the context of secession implies a remedy for grave and 
massive human rights wrongs, a correction by way of state creation at a 
center of which is a cultural minority turned people. 
The high threshold of human rights abuse, the last remedy 
conditionality, as well as other characteristics that the cultural group ought 
to fulfill appear to narrow the scope of remedial secession to very few, if not 
singular, cases. In the end, not the implosion of the international system by a 
wave of secessionist movements is envisaged, but a remedy for situations, 
which by their existence can endanger peace and security. In fact, Lee 
Buchheit, who coined the term remedial secession, regards it as a 
conservative doctrine geared to protect the state-centered order. It is in the 
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power of the states not to let the situation reach the threshold and hence 
avoid opening the door to remedial secession.62 
It goes without saying that the different streams of thought that argue 
that cultural nations must become political states, would a priori raise 
objections to remedial secession.63 Certainly, remedial secession can be 
subjected to many moral and factual challenges. It does introduce a double 
standard in recognizing the existence of a people and it does not offer a 
remedy to minority groups which experience discrimination short of 
massive and grave. It may involve tremendous human costs and does not 
offer a certain solution for peaceful coexistence and stability once the 
secession is consummate.64 In legal doctrine, however, it is not these caveats 
that are central to the dispute; the unwillingness to accommodate remedial 
secession is rather based on its presumed failure to pass the legal scrutiny 
test. 
The safeguard clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration is regarded 
as the starting point for inferring the right to remedial secession: 
 
“Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, 
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and 
thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to 
the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.”65 
 
The first part of the text appears to represent a rejection of secession, 
while the second section comes to condition the rejection by the existence of 
a representative government. Arguments against implying a right to 
secession from the Friendly Relations Declaration stress upon the 
contextuality of the safeguard clause, i.e. the paragraph requiring 
representation has been envisaged against the South African and Southern 
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Rhodesian racist regimes.66 Nonetheless, as the apartheid regime in South 
Africa was dismantling, in 1993, the UN World Conference on Human 
Rights included in its Vienna Declaration a very similar phrase,67 the same 
example was followed by the GA Declaration with the occasion of the 
fiftieth anniversary of the UN in 1995.68 Against this background, the 
validity of the contextuality thesis can be questioned. 
Even admitting that remedial secession can be implied from the above 
documents it remains a fact that all of them amount to soft law.69 In the eyes 
of some scholars, the non-binding legal character makes them short of law 
proper, hence at best a shaky ground for the remedial secession theory. 
Consensual adoption, corroborated with the principle of bona fide – of 
which the states were surely aware while agreeing to the texts – have to 
amount to more than uncertain grounds. Discounting this would equate with 
assuming that states did not express disagreement, however did not intend to 
follow the letter of the declarations either, therefore acted in bad faith. 
Another line of thought insists on the temporary character of a 
government that pursues discriminatory policies. Hence, a radical solution, 
remedial secession, would be chosen to resolve a provisional situation, 
while the struggle for restoration of human rights would be more 
appropriate.70 Resort to economic and political sanctions by the 
international community is also regarded as the less legally controversial 
means to determine governments to stop abuses.71 Indeed an interesting 
argumentation path. Nevertheless, at least since Einstein’s discovery, one 
would have to acknowledge that time is relative. The temporary character of 
a regime committing extreme abuses against part of its population seen 
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through the eyes of that particular group might not look that temporary after 
all, and this image might linger beyond the actual taking place of the abuse. 
Indeed, psychological and sociological factors may at times step in to 
complicate situations. Even after a perpetrator seized to be a perpetrator, it 
tends to be difficult for a victim to peacefully live and strive alongside its 
former abuser. The second suggestion, which relies on the international 
community willingness or, as coined more recently by UN language, 
responsibility to protect, is obviously preferable to remedial secession. 
Besides experience which comes to contradict that this option is always 
validated – either because the world community fails to act or because its 
actions have no impact on the perpetrator government – such a path places 
the already massively and grave oppressed group in the position of a 
dependent victim.  
Perhaps best to summarize the discussion regarding the de lege lata 
vs. de lege feranda status of remedial secession is by reference to the 
findings of the Supreme Court of Canada: “it remains unclear whether this 
[…] actually reflects an established international law standard”.72 With the 
risk of emitting truisms, this section concludes that the legal concept of 
people as subject of the right to self-determination – with its internal and 
external components – remains a social construction and hence its 
boundaries continue to be fluid, regardless of the apparent present 
preference for a purely territorial formula.  
3. Sovereignty and Its Corollary Principles 
As Helmut Steinberger asserts, “[t]he history of the notion of 
sovereignty in international law is almost identical with the full-scale 
history of international law itself.”73 The principle of sovereignty has 
become the backbone of the world system; respect for territorial integrity 
and non-intervention in the affairs of other states, as corollary principles, are 
tenets of the Westphalian Model designed to sanction and safeguard the 
status quo in this system.74 The prohibition on the threat or use of force, on 
the other hand, belongs to the new conceptual developments prompted by 
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the devastation of the two World Wars; it gained its status as fundamental 
principle of international law through its proclamation in Art. 2(4) of the 
UN Charter.  
Territorial integrity refers to the material elements of a state, the 
physical and demographic resources that lie within the frontiers of the 
state.75 It is beyond question that this principle applies generally in inter-
state relations, and hence it represents a guarantee “contre tout 
démembrement du territoire”.76 The question in the context of secession is 
whether a secessionist movement, as a non-state actor, is equally bound by 
this principle.  
A differentiation has to be made here based on the character of the 
secessionist movement, i.e. whether the entity seeking secession is a people 
or not. As was discussed earlier, a people – subject to its recognition as such 
by the international community – has the right to internal and external self-
determination and therefore respect for territorial integrity would not be 
opposable to it. On the contrary, the territory for which people seek 
independent statehood cannot be dismembered, by, for example, the former 
colonial power.77 In the latter case, Olivier Corten discerns from current 
practice an oscillation between a traditional neutral approach towards 
secession and developments condemning the breach of territorial integrity 
by secessionist movements.78 Traditionally, international law is said to be 
“legally neutral” to secession, envisaging the modus operandi “ni autorisée, 
ni interdite”.79 Since secessionist groups are not regarded as subjects of 
international law, international regulations on the issue of territorial 
integrity are not extended to them. The second tendency is to oppose to 
(violent) secessionist movements the respect for the principle of territorial 
integrity.80 By virtue of this development, the neutrality of international law 
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in respect to secession appears to be challenged, rather an interdiction of 
secession could be inferred. It remains to be seen whether this trend will 
develop in opposition to the clear statement by the ICJ in its Advisory 
Opinion on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence which clearly 
confines the scope of the principle of territorial integrity to the “sphere of 
relations between states”.81 
The principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states, as it has 
been postulated by the ICJ, in a positive definition, involves “the right of 
every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference”.82 
The principle of non-use of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter prohibits states from using or threatening to use force in the conduct 
of their international relations. Collective enforcement measures (Chapter 
VII), individual and collective self-defense (Article 51), enforcement 
measures by regional agencies with the authorization of the Security 
Council (Chapter VIII) and Articles 106 and 107 on former “enemy states” 
are the exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force. 
In the context of the present discussion on secession, again, a 
distinction has to be made between peoples that exercise their right to self-
determination and movements that are not recognized as having such a 
right. In the latter case, states are bound to abstain from giving any kind of 
support to such entities.83 If the actions of the secessionist movement 
involve the threat or use of force, the assisting state would be in breach of 
both the principle of non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of 
force.84 Article 16 on “aid and assistance in the commission of wrongful 
acts” of the ILC Draft Articles refers to situations between two states, and 
thus may arguably not be applicable to a situation in which a state is 
complicit in violations committed by a non-state entity such a secessionist 
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movement.85 However, in the Genocide Convention Case, the ICJ resorted 
to the complicity test entailed by Article 16 to inquire whether Serbia and 
Montenegro aided and assisted the Republika Srpska – a non-state entity – 
in the commission of the Srebrenica genocide.86 With Northern Cyprus as 
res ipsa loquitur example, it is argued more generally, that a shift from the 
laissez faire doctrine or neutrality of international law in respect to 
secession towards the principle of legality is at stake.87 In other words, the 
conformity of newly created states with the existent legal order – among 
which the principles of non-intervention and non-use of force – is required, 
whereas solely effectiveness88 becomes insufficient.  
The case of peoples exercising their right to self-determination depicts 
a threefold relation informed by the principles of non-intervention and non-
use of force. The first refers to the relation between a people seeking 
independent statehood in the view of its right to self-determination and the 
state against which it is opposing the claim. The state “has the duty to 
refrain from any forcible action” against the people;89 if the state fails to 
respect this obligation the situation amounts to a particular case of self-
defense, hence the people is granted “a legal license” to use force.90 This 
however is not to say that the peoples have the right to use forcible means to 
exercise their right to self-determination, which indeed remains debated 
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among states and the doctrine.91 From the Friendly Relations Declaration it 
is clear that third states are also duty-bound not to assist the state denying 
self-determination. Moreover, the peoples are legally entitled to receive 
from third states assistance “in accordance with the purposes and principles 
of the Charter.”92 In the view of some of the scholars, the phrase is to be 
interpreted as aid short of military support. Nonetheless, military assistance 
or armed intervention by a third state on behalf of a people remains 
controversial and probably the major stumble block for agreement over the 
crime of aggression and the Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism.93 
The tension between sovereignty and corollary principles on one hand, 
and secession on the other is notorious. On a continuum of significations the 
relation is depicted as irreconcilable, necessary in order to sustain an un-
chaotic world or compatible. Context, however, is the key element in 
explaining all the attributed significations, as has been shown in the 
previous sections. 
III. An Intermezzo: On State Practice and Secession 
The current chapter on the theory of secession was introduced by a 
citation emphasizing the allergy of states towards the concept of secession. 
The quote could as well be employed to describe the behavior of states, or 
state practice, towards secession. Beyond the decolonization and occupation 
contexts – which, as has been underlined, cannot serve as evidence of 
secession94 – state practice very rarely sanctions instances of secession.95  
 For example, the new states created after the demise of the Soviet 
Union in the early 1990s were, allegedly, a result of dissolution not of 
secession. It is noteworthy that recognition and membership to the UN had 
been considered only after the Soviet Government recognized the “new” 
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republics.96 In the case of Yugoslavia, it became generally accepted that the 
process at stake was one of dissolution, and not one of successive 
secessions. The Badinter Commission even announced the finality of the 
process of dissolution in its Opinion no. 8 and UN membership was granted 
to the former republics only after the SFRY renounced any territorial claims 
over them.97 Lastly then, one should recall the case of Bangladesh. The 
break-away of the former East Pakistan from Pakistan in 1971 is proclaimed 
by some as a successful case of remedial secession.98 However, others doubt 
the entrance of Bangladesh in the community of states via the remedial 
secession route and point much rather to the fait accompli theory 
corroborated with the renunciation of title over the territory by Pakistan in 
1974.99 What speaks for this interpretation is state practice, or absence 
thereof if one wishes, since the international community remained silent on 
the issue of self-determination in the case of Bangladesh.100  
 Drawing on the work of James Crawford, one author asserts, “for a 
secession claim to be considered legal, State practice tends to emphasize 
consent of the parties involved as a necessary condition”101. This 
interpretation however seems to regard recognition as an equivalent to a 
claim of legality, while this might not hold true implicitly. For example, 
recognition can be lawfully granted when the recognizing state is merely 
convinced that the seceding state is not in violation of international law, 
which in turn does not automatically mean that there is a right to secession 
of that state but only a lack of an express prohibition. The ICJ appears to 
offer a similar interpretation when it argues that  
“the illegality attached to the declarations of independence [by the 
Security Council] thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these 
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declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, 
connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of 
norms of general international law”102. 
In the end, outside the decolonization context, on the rare occasion 
when an act of secession is sanctioned by state practice, the latter appears 
not to be grounded in the right to self-determination or remedial secession.  
IV. Is There a Right to Secession? 
This chapter should have been placed under a warning of high 
complexity! Much too often the discussion was framed in conditional tenses 
and much too often a clear conclusion has not been reached. Yet, to 
paraphrase Martti Koskenniemi, this is the beauty of international law.103  
In a nutshell: 
There is no general jus secedendi.  
There are instances in which a right to secession is recognized under 
international law. These refer to states explicitly acknowledging a right to 
secession in their domestic law or multinational states recognizing that their 
constituent peoples have the right to self-determination.  
There is one controversial case that divides scholarship, the one of 
remedial secession.  
Lastly, there is a trend towards the legality principle governing 
secessions as distinguished from the traditional neutrality doctrine.104  
C. The Kosovo Practice 
“What I experienced in our brotherly union, I wouldn't wish on my 
own brother.” 
“We will do our best not to have any more fratricide. We will stop 
being brothers.”105 
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Given the findings in the previous chapter, it appears that remedial 
secession represents the core of the legal precedent debate in the Kosovo 
case. In the same time however, if the Constitution of Serbia in force at the 
time of Kosovo’s secession provided for a right to secession then the 
precedent question would not have any relevance in the first place. It 
becomes obvious that the legal implications need to be fleshed out from 
socio-political and historic events. 
I. Kosovo in History 
1. History and Myth 
It has become a tradition – for reasons of symbolism rather than 
historic accuracy – to seek the roots of the Kosovo conflict in the battle of 
Kosovo Polje (1389) when the Serbs were defeated by the Ottoman 
Empire.106 Five hundred years later, in 1912, as a result of the First Balkan 
War, Serbia reacquired control over Kosovo. A memorandum sent to the 
Great Powers by the Serbian government in 1913 provided the justification 
for Belgrade’s rule over Kosovo: 
 
“[T]he moral right of a more civilized people; the historic right to an 
area which contained the Patriarchate buildings of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church and had once been part of the medieval Serbian empire; and a kind 
of ethnographic right based on the fact that at some time in the past Kosovo 
had had a majority of Serb population, a right which […] was unaffected by 
the “recent invasion” of Albanians.”107 
 
While the first argument that relies on a (rightly) repudiated 
civilization doctrine does not deserve further discussion, the following two 
are essential and have deep implications on the current political 
configuration. Noel Malcolm argues that Kosovo as the Jerusalem of 
Serbian Orthodoxy is an “exaggeration”: a holy place in Christianity does 
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not play a similar role as in Judaism. Moreover, the seat of the Orthodox 
Church was arguably not founded in Kosovo, but moved here after the 
initial foundation in central Serbia got burnt. In addition, the institution of 
the Patriarchate is said not to have any continuous history.108 Rebutting the 
claim for continuation, several authors assert that the Serbian empire was a 
medieval state that had its origins in Rascia, not in Kosovo.109 Not least, the 
ethnographic factor is one of the most disputed issues in the history of the 
region. One can find accounts that depict Albanians as majoritarian even 
during the days of the medieval Serbian empire; other instances recall that 
no Albanians at all lived in Kosovo until the end of the seventeenth century. 
An explanation of today’s demographics, said to be closer to historic 
evidence, would take into account both migration flows from Albania and 
the significant expansion of the indigenous Albanian population in 
Kosovo.110 
Noel Malcolm’s deconstruction exercise may be perfectly valid; 
nonetheless, what tends to be important are not facts, but the perception of 
facts or, otherwise put, the myth. Perception has been reinforced by the folk 
tradition of epic poetry and in modern times by nationalistic discourse. 
Hence the Serbs’ emotional attachment to Kosovo as the source of 
Orthodoxy remains strong, equally their narratives of the battle of Kosovo 
and the loss of an empire. For the Albanians on the other hand, Kosovo 
represents the birthplace of Albanian nationalism, where in 1877 the League 
of Prizren was created as a response to the Treaty of San Stefano. Its goal 
was to defend Albanian territories and to seek autonomy within the Ottoman 
Empire.111 One can trace the aspirations towards the creation of a Greater 
Albania to those days. Whereas Albania gained its independence from the 
Porte in 1912, Kosovo by contrast became controlled by Serbian-
Montenegrin rule112; the Kosovo Albanians regarded this event as 
colonization113, which in turn reinforced their ideal of a Greater Albania. 
Writers agree that the story of a perpetual ethnic conflict raging in 
Kosovo is a brutal oversimplification of a quite different reality, one that in 
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109
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fact saw the two groups themselves split along other types of allegiances 
than ethnic ones, or that witnessed them fight side by side as allies. That is 
however not to deny that, since the nineteenth century, ethnicity has became 
a significant element and today the same 1912 event is recalled by the Serbs 
as national liberation while the Kosovo Albanian portray it as colonization – 
two narratives forced to coexist.  
2. Kosovo under Tito and the Titoists 
After the end of World War II, Josip Broz Tito thought to forge 
legitimacy for communist Yugoslavia by invoking the mythology of the 
Partisan movement. The common resistance against Nazism was portrayed 
as the bonding element of the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, inter-
ethnic cooperation that should have continued under the communist banner. 
In addition to the doctrine of brotherhood and unity, the federalization of 
Yugoslavia and the granting of autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina were 
measures intended to respond to ethnic grievances, seen as central to the 
failure of pre-war Yugoslavia.114 In 1964, with the passing of a new 
fundamental act, Kosovo-Metohija’s status was elevated from that of an 
autonomous region to the equal of Vojvodina’s, i.e. an autonomous 
province. Responding to increasingly sharp ethnic frictions among which 
the risings of Kosovo Albanians in 1968, the years to come saw further 
constitutional amendments in the direction of devolution, a process that 
culminated in the adoption of the 1974 Constitution. It granted Kosovo and 
Vojvodina nearly the same rights as to the six republics – Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia – in 
terms of administrative and economic power, as well as representation at the 
federation level. The crucial differentiation was that while the narodi 
(nations) were granted the status of republics, narodnosti (nationalities) 
were designated autonomous provinces. It is reckoned that this distinction is 
the oeuvre of the architects of the first Yugoslav constitution who 
considered that nations as potentially State forming units are those that have 
their principal homeland inside Yugoslavia, whereas nationalities as 
displaced segments of other nations had their homeland outside 
 
114
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Yugoslavia.115 Consequently, it was only narodi that received the 
constitutional right to self-determination, which explicitly included the right 
to secession.  
To mention the almost equal status of Kosovo with that of the 
republics does not mean to idealize the on the ground situation in Kosovo. 
As an autonomous region of Serbia, Kosovo was regarded as a developed 
region and did not benefit of economic aid until the mid 1950s. As Sabrina 
Ramet shows “Kosovo was by all measures, the poorest, most backward 
region in the SFRY”. Employment in the social sector and representation in 
the party ranks remained discriminatory of the Albanian majority population 
until the mid 1970s, only to become discriminatory of the Serbs few years 
later.116 Clearly, these facts fueled inter-ethnic tension and deepened the 
distrust within Kosovo; chiefly, the measures intended to ameliorate the 
lives of the members of one ethnic group were perceived as a threat to the 
other.  
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Graph 1 – Kosovo population by ethnic composition 1948-2006117 
 
Legend 
1948, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981: population censuses of 
the Yugoslav Federation Office of Statistics (YFOS) 
1991: census boycotted by Kosovo Albanians, the data is 
an assessment of the YFOS  
2000: data from the Living Standard Measurement 
Survey 2000  
2006: assessment of the Statistical Office of Kosovo, 
residents (living within Kosovo, missing from permanent 
place for less than 12 months) 
Others: Roma, Turks, others 
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Above all, while the Serbs experienced the sentiment of losing 
Kosovo, the Albanians’ dissatisfaction continued to point to what they 
perceived as the original wrong, the lack of republic status within the 
federation. Soon after Tito’s death in 1980, what started as a protest against 
food conditions in the cafeteria of the University of Pristina turned into a 
series of political protests with open demands for a Kosovo republic within 
Yugoslavia.118 The snowball was set in motion: accusations of brutalities 
committed by Albanians against Serbs were pouring and the rhetoric of the 
sufferings of the Serbs augmented sharply, culminating in the elites’ 
articulation of the “physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide of the 
Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija” in the Memorandum of the 
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.119 Whereas several commentators 
note that some claims of violent actions against Kosovo Serbs were 
undeniable reality,120 the accusation of genocide does not gather any 
support.121 
3. The Milošević Era 
It is argued that Slobodan Milošević had sensed already in the mid 
1980s the potential political gains from linking the rising intellectual 
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nationalist movement to the advancement of his own power.122 By the end 
of 1987, Milošević had ousted the Titoist leader of the Serbian Communist 
party and abandoned the bonding policy of Yugoslavia, the doctrine of 
brotherhood and unity. In a bid for legitimacy, Milošević sought the 
blessing of the Serbian Orthodox Church, while purging the leadership of 
Kosovo’s and Vojvodina’s communist parties and suspending the authority 
of the provincial police and judiciary.123 “Strong Serbia, strong Yugoslavia” 
was the mass mobilizing slogan which demanded an end to the provinces’ 
autonomy and parity with Serbia, the latter being long perceived as reducing 
Serbia to a minority status within its own federal unit.124 In 1988 and 1989, 
while avoiding to take the legal route of the revision of the SFRY 
Constitution, the Serbian Parliament brought a series of amendments to the 
Serbian Constitution which in practice stripped Kosovo and Vojvodina of 
their federal status.125 It is highly likely that abolishing in this way Kosovo’s 
status as a federal unit was unlawful under the SFRY Constitution, and 
hence null and void.126 The Yugoslav Constitutional Court itself has ruled 
some of the amendments as unconstitutional.127 The new Serbian 
Constitution adopted in 1990 which sealed the full subordination of 
Kosovo128, sounded the death bells for the SFRY, even for the few 
remaining Yugoslav optimists.  
Kosovo responded with a declaration of sovereignty and after holding 
an underground referendum – boycotted by the Serb population – with the 
declaration of independence of 22 September 1991. Shortly after, three 
options were put forward in a political declaration129:  
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The status of nation of the Kosovo Albanians and of republic within 
Yugoslavia for Kosovo, if the internal and external borders of the SFRY 
were to remain unaltered; 
The founding within the SFRY of an Albanian Republic incorporating 
Kosovo and the territories inhabited by Albanians in central Serbia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia, in case the internal borders were to be 
changed; 
Unification with Albania and the creation of an “undivided Albanian 
state” with the boundaries proclaimed by the League of Prizren in 1878, if 
external borders were to be altered. 
Whereas Slovenia and Croatia gained recognition of their 
independence in 1992, after the international community had accepted 
earlier that the SFRY was in a process of dissolution,130 the sole state to 
recognize the Republic of Kosovo was Albania.131 
4. The Human Rights Situation (1990-1997) 
The Yugoslav/Serb government is reckoned to have conducted 
“repression … very much officially and under a veritable legislative 
programme”.132 Thus, the scale and kind of abuse which took place in 
Kosovo are documented not only by UN bodies and special procedures133 
and NGOs134, but also by Serbian laws which themselves legalized 
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discrimination.135 Based on these reports distinct categories of abuses can be 
identified for the period 1989-1998: discrimination in relation to property 
and resettlement; removal of ethnic Albanians from public office, 
commercial firms, the education system and the judiciary branch; large scale 
infringements of the freedom of the press; lack of fair trial; impunity for 
perpetrators; arbitrary arrests and seizures; torture and mistreatment; police 
brutality and disproportionate use of force; imposing of a Serb curricula 
which prompted the general break down of the official education system.  
In short, Human Rights Watch in its report covering the period 1990-
1992 notes that “the Serbian government has blatantly and systematically 
violated the most basic tenets set forth in international human rights 
documents.”136 In 1996, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination summarizes the situation as one that “deprived [the ethnic 
Albanians] of effective enjoyment of the most basic human rights provided 
for in the Convention”.137 
5. The Kosovo Albanian Resistance and Milošević’s Response 
Non-violent resistance was the initial response of the Kosovo 
Albanians to the new situation. A shadow state had been created, with a 
parallel government and parliament of which Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of 
the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was elected President. Some 
authors explain Rugova’s peaceful resistance – and non-alignment/lack of 
support for either Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina – as a sort of waiting 
period. In other words, Ibrahim Rugova had hoped that Krajina and the 
Republic of Srpska could join Serbia, which in turn would have set a 
precedent for Kosovo joining Albania.138 The merit of this interpretation is 
however uncertain. In a 1992 interview, Bujar Bukoshi, the premier of the 
non-recognized Republic of Kosovo, affirmed that Kosovo should be 
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“independent, neutral and open to both Serbia and Albania”, whereas the 
unification with Albania would be postponed for “the third millennium, for 
example”.139 Others point to the pacific strategy as a continuation of a 
tradition of democratic opposition and peaceful resistance dominant in 
Eastern Europe during the communist period.140  
Be it as it may, by 1993 some started to voice their disappointment 
towards the adopted non-violent path which seemed impotent. The LDK 
began to lose support in the mid-1990s when mostly the younger generation 
shifted its allegiances to more radical ethnic-Albanian groups.141 The 
alternative to the pacific path that divided the Albanians from Kosovo and 
the diaspora alike came from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In 1996, 
the KLA claimed responsibility for a series of bomb attacks and proclaimed 
the liberation of Kosovo through armed struggle as its goal.142 Whereas the 
collapse of the Albanian state meant access to weapons and training camps 
for the group, tapping into the disillusionment of Albanians meant support 
and swelling ranks; by 1998, the KLA staged several attacks that left them 
in control over the Drenica region.143  
The campaign of the Serbian security forces, termed as the fight 
against Albanian terrorism, was launched in February 1998. Reports from 
governmental sources or NGO accounts note unequivocally the atrocities 
against civilians. Establishing a balance sheet intended to compare the 
abuses committed by the Serbian government versus the ones for which the 
KLA was responsible would be a rather cynical exercise. With this restraint 
in mind however, and since the atrocities are an essential aspect in the 
context of remedial secession, the conclusion of Human Rights Watch 
should be recalled: “The vast majority of these abuses were committed by 
Yugoslav government forces … The Kosova Liberation Army … has also 
violated the laws of war … Although on a smaller scale than the 
 
139
  ‘News briefing with Bujar Bukoshi, Prime Minister, Republic of Kosova, National 
Press Club, Washington D.C.’ in Federal News Service, 21 October 1992. 
140
  The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report. Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned (2000), 44. 
141
  International Institute for Strategic Studies, Serbia. (Kosovo). Historical Background. 
Armed Conflict Database, available at http://www.iiss.org/ (last visited 25 August 
2010). 
142
  ‘Kosovo Liberation Army emerges from the shadows’, BBC News, 4 March 1998; 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, supra note 141. 
143
  International Institute for Strategic Studies, supra note 141; R. Caplan, supra note 
115, 752. 
Secession in Theory and Practice: the Case of Kosovo and Beyond 565
government abuses, these too are violations of international standards, and 
should be condemned.”144  
Regardless whether an Operation Horseshoe145 existed or not, there is 
evidence that Serbian forces in Kosovo pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing 
at least since 20 March 1999. There is widespread agreement among those 
who documented and studied the 1999 events in Kosovo that a systematic 
and forced removal of Kosovo Albanians from their homes and 
communities had taken place.146 In May 1999, after meeting refugees from 
Kosovo in the F.Y.R. Macedonia, Mary Robinson, the then High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, said: “the full magnitude of the problem 
and its tragic consequences can only be realized when seen first hand.”147 
Yet outside observers can grasp the scale of the atrocities by referring to the 
OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission estimates, which put forth that over 90 
percent of the Kosovo Albanian population – over 1.45 million people – had 
been displaced by 9 June 1999.148  
To sum up with the evidently negotiated and hence diplomatic 
conclusion of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo: the 
“Serb oppression included numerous atrocities that appeared to have the 
character of crimes against humanity in the sense that this term has been 
understood since the Nuremberg judgment.”149  
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II. The International Community and Kosovo 
1. The Response of the International Community Prior to 1998 
From the early 1990s onwards, the abuses and discrimination on the 
ground have been duly noted by international organizations and 
subsequently condemned in statements and resolutions. Nonetheless, the 
status of Kosovo was largely left out from the European Community (EC) 
Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, the London Conference and later the 
Dayton negotiations. On 22 December 1991, Kosovo formally applied for 
recognition in a letter addressed to Lord Carrington, the Chair of the Peace 
Conference on Yugoslavia; the application was never forwarded to the 
Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia and hence was 
not addressed by the latter.150 Regardless, some commentators see certain 
relevance in the findings of the Badinter Arbitration Commission in what 
concerns the status of Kosovo. As such: 
 
“1. The Committee considers: […] d) that in the case of a federal-type 
State, which embraces communities that possess a degree of autonomy 
and, moreover, participate in the exercise of political power within the 
framework of institutions common to the Federation, the existence of 
the State implies that the federal organs represent the components of 
the Federation and wield effective power.”151 
 
 
Paragraph 1.d. of Opinion No.1 could be interpreted as speaking in 
favor of Kosovo’s independence claim since, under the 1974 Constitution, it 
had been a federal entity equally represented in the federal institutions and 
possessing a high level of autonomy.152 On the other hand, Opinion No.2 
which dealt with the question whether “the Serbian population in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, 
have the right to self-determination” concluded that the Serbian population 
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is “entitled to all the rights concerned to minorities and ethnic groups under 
international law”153. By analogy and given the status of Kosovo under the 
1974 Constitution as narodnosti – even more so under the controversial 
1990 Serbian fundamental act – the Committee’s findings would speak 
against a right to self-determination of the Kosovo Albanians. This later 
interpretation is consistent with the view taken by some authors who regard 
the refusal to even submit Kosovo’s claim for independence to the Badinter 
Commission as a confirmation of the EC’s readiness to grant recognition 
solely to the republics of Yugoslavia.154 The 1992 EC statement which 
reminded “the inhabitants of Kosovo that their legitimate quest for 
autonomy should be dealt with in the framework of the EC Peace 
Conference” comes to confirm the above.155 What it does not suggest is the 
subsequent reality: the Hague, London and Dayton conferences did not 
foster any substantial discussion on Kosovo and failed to deal with its status. 
This silence is explained by an already rich and thorny agenda, the desire 
not to alienate Milošević, whose support was regarded as essential, and 
paradoxically the absence of violence in Kosovo given Rugova’s pacific 
resistance strategy.156  
2. The Breakout of Violence and the Response of the 
International Community 
The course of action taken by the international community after the 
violence in Kosovo came to mirror, somehow cynically, President Bush’s 
letter addressed to Slobodan Milošević already in 1992: “In the event of 
conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be 
prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia 
proper.”157 If in February 1998, the U.S. special envoy to the Balkans 
Robert Gelbard pointed to Washington’s readiness to lift several of the 
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sanctions imposed earlier on Belgrade158, the following month he threatened 
with the reverse in case no amelioration of the Kosovo Albanians’ situation 
would be visible.159 It is undeniable that the interest in the Kosovo conflict 
grew proportionally with the violence occurring on the ground. From March 
1998 onwards, Kosovo caught the attention of the international community 
and several fora addressed the situation on the ground, as well as the status 
issue; four of this institutional responses are of central importance for the 
further analysis.  
The Security Council – which remained silent on the issue of human 
rights violations in Kosovo prior to 1998 – passed a series of resolutions 
under Chapter VII of the Charter. The potential of conflict spillover, the 
humanitarian dimension within Kosovo as well as the problem posed by the 
refugee flows are usually seen as being the key considerations which 
dismissed, in the eyes of the Security Council, the traditional objection 
brought by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), i.e. Kosovo as a 
matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction.160 The Council imposed 
an arms embargo upon the FRY “including Kosovo”161 and demanded, 
among others, that the FRY ceases “all action by the security forces 
affecting the civilian population and order the withdrawal of security units 
used for civilian repression” and that it enters “immediately into a 
meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with international 
involvement” aimed at negotiating a political solution for the “issue of 
Kosovo”.162 The rough criticism of the Belgrade government was balanced 
by two elements. The first amounts to the condemnation of “acts of 
terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army”.163 Secondly, an aspect of great 
importance for the determination of Kosovo’s status is the recurrent 
affirmation of the “commitment … to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.164 
 In June 1998 the European Council, gathered in Cardiff, condemned 
in its Declaration on Kosovo “in the strongest terms” the indiscriminate use 
of force by Milošević’s security forces, underlining that brutal military 
repression of the own citizens would disqualify any state from finding a 
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place in modern Europe.165 The continuation of the repression would require 
in the words of the Council “a much stronger response of a qualitatively 
different order”. In the same time, the Council reiterated that “the European 
Union remains firmly opposed to [Kosovo’s] independence.”166 Despite this 
clear stance, in early 1999 important political figures of the time could be 
heard advocating for either independence or a Kosovo placed under an 
international protectorate.167 
The Contact Group168 as a modern concert of powers that had omitted 
to deal with Kosovo on the Dayton occasion plunged in the midst of the 
mediation process aimed at resolving the conflict. In July 1998, it declared 
that it supported neither the preservation of the status quo, nor Kosovo’s 
independence.169 With both Ambassador Hill’s shuttle diplomacy170 and the 
Holbrooke agreement171 having failed, the Contact Group summoned the 
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parties to the Rambouillet conference on 6-23 February 1999. The NATO, 
which since October 1998 had kept the activation order authorizing air 
strikes against targets on FRY territory in place, reiterated its threat172 and 
added the teeth – and the controversy – to the summons of the Contact 
Group. 
The Rambouillet agreement was intended to be an interim mechanism 
– as its name fittingly suggests – aimed at achieving peace and self-
government in Kosovo. The balancing between the interests of the parties is 
excellently illustrated by the preambular provision of Chapter 1:  
Desiring through this interim Constitution to establish institutions of 
democratic self-government in Kosovo grounded in respect for the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and from 
this Agreement, from which the authorities of governance set forth herein 
originate.173 
The two pillar elements of the agreement are: 1. the establishment of a 
system of wide autonomy for Kosovo; 2. the guarantee for the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the FRY. The third crucial element is the time-
boundness of the Rambouillet agreement. After three years upon the entry 
into force, an international conference was to be convened in order to 
establish  
a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will 
of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party’s efforts regarding 
the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act.174  
The key to the reading of the first two elements is this last provision, 
which suggests that the status of Kosovo is not agreed upon beyond the 
three years period. Kosovo’s interpretation was that it would not find itself 
locked by this agreement to respect the territorial integrity of the FRY 
beyond the three years period. Moreover, the mechanism to be established 
after the three years period in order to deal with Kosovo’s final status was to 
operate, inter alia, based on the will of the people and in accordance with 
the Helsinki Final Act. The reference to the 1975 CSCE document has a 
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neutral effect on the future status question since the Helsinki Act stipulates 
both the respect for territorial integrity and the right to self-determination of 
peoples. On the other hand, the specific mention of the term people is even 
more so noteworthy. Given the legal implications of this term (which were 
pointed out in the first part of this article) one has to wonder if the 
Rambouillet agreement does not in fact open the door to Kosovo’s 
secession.  
The agreement was signed during the follow up meeting in Paris by 
Kosovo and rejected by Serbia/the FRY.175 Much controversy surrounds the 
Rambouillet agreement and much of this debate needs to be understood in 
the context of the NATO’s subsequent military operation against Serbia.  
If there is a consensus among commentators regarding the NATO’s 
Operation Allied Force launched on 24 March 1999, then that consensus 
refers to the interventions’ controversial character. Not only the legality of 
the intervention is questioned, but equally the means and methods 
employed, as well as the practical result and the legal consequences. Given 
these circumstances, the current article will assume the shortcoming of not 
entering into an extensive discussion on the issue. Yet an important aspect 
needs to be retained: The NATO’s official justification of the bombing 
campaign was “the massive humanitarian catastrophe.”176 It was noted 
earlier that according to doctrine, massive and grave abuse represents the 
threshold for remedial secession. Given the official explanation of the 
NATO’s intervention, it appears that the trigger of the military campaign 
coincides with the threshold of remedial secession. By inference then, if 
humanitarian intervention was presented and perceived as legal by the 
NATO states, the same states should have theoretically followed the same 
logic subsequently in respect to remedial secession. 
  Given the prohibition on the use of force, if one regards the NATO 
bombing campaign on Serbia as illegal, then the question has to be asked, if 
this intervention can be seen as support on behalf of the Kosovo secessionist 
movement. As many doubts as there might be regarding the legality of 
humanitarian intervention, there is simply no plausible evidence that the 
NATO’s goal was Kosovo’s secession and not the declared one of avoiding 
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a humanitarian catastrophe and halting the spread of conflict. Security 
Council resolution 1244 (1999), while – in the view of this author – not 
legalizing the attack a posteriori, did address the precise humanitarian 
concerns previously exposed by the NATO and hence did legitimize the 
goal of the attack. Nonetheless, these series of “ifs” remain probably the 
major caveat of Kosovo’s secession from Serbia.  
3. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 is the result 
of the accord reached between members of the NATO and the Russian 
Federation during the G8 meeting in May 1999, an accord subsequently 
accepted by the Belgrade authorities.177 The resolution authorizes an 
international security presence in Kosovo with “substantial North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization participation … deployed under unified command and 
control” (KFOR) and an international civil presence “in order to provide an 
interim administration for Kosovo”.178  
The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) has two overarching responsibilities. The first refers to 
“promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial 
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 
and of the Rambouillet accords.”179 A gradual process of devolution of 
power was provided for, so as to relocate the administrative responsibilities 
towards Kosovo’s local provisional institutions. Moreover, “in a final 
stage”, UNMIK is to oversee the transfer of authority from the provisional 
institutions to the “institutions established under a political settlement.”180 
The second major task is the facilitation of the “political process designed to 
determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet 
accords.”181 
The UNMIK February 2008 update on the situation in Kosovo 
acknowledges that the process of democratic institution building has been 
accomplished in a way which has allowed UNMIK to renounce its executive 
role and retreat in a position of monitoring and support to the local 
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institutions; “UNMIK in its present form is now in its final chapter before 
status resolution.”182 Referring back to the elements required for a State to 
come into being, the UNMIK statement could be interpreted as the 
fulfillment of the principle of effectiveness by Kosovo.183 
Since late 2005, the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, Martti Ahtisaari, led the political process for the future 
status for Kosovo. In effect he was endorsed by the Council to implement 
the provisions related to the future status of resolution 1244 (1999). The 
Contact Group “informed” the parties involved in the negotiation that the 
resolve was to respect a number of principles, among which sustainable 
multi-ethnicity and the protection of cultural and religious heritage in 
Kosovo, in particular the Serbian Orthodox sites.184 While neither 
independence nor autonomy is advocated, principle 6 rejects the partition of 
Kosovo or the union with another country or part of a country. The Contact 
Group is firm in its view regarding the process that ought to be followed for 
a final status: “Any solution that is unilateral or results from the use of force 
would be unacceptable”.185 In 2006, in a statement resonant of remedial 
secession argumentation, the Contact Group added a new principle to its 
requirements, i.e. the acceptability of the settlement to “the people of 
Kosovo”.186 
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Before addressing the Ahtisaari Plan, it is necessary to distinguish the 
position of the Security Council vis-à-vis the status question. In other words, 
did the Council through its resolution forbid secession or did it endorse it? 
In the light of the theoretical part of this study, the principle of territorial 
integrity and the right to self-determination of peoples will be emphasized.  
The preambular clause of Security Council resolution 1244(1999) 
reaffirms  
the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the 
region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2. 187 
Whereas Annex 2, Article 8 stipulates that the “interim political 
framework agreement” shall take full account of the Rambouillet accords 
and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the 
demilitarization of UCK.188 
 The reference to territorial integrity is often presented as the 
paramount guarantee against Kosovo’s secession.189 However, a correct 
reading of the text reveals that the commitment is towards territorial 
integrity – nota bene of FRY, not of Serbia – “as set out in the Helsinki 
Final Act and annex 2”.190 Indeed, territorial integrity appears to be 
qualified by the Helsinki Final Act and the Rambouillet accords, as has been 
noted also by the USA in their Written Statement to the ICJ in the Kosovo 
proceedings.191 While the Helsinki Final Act proclaims both the principle of 
territorial integrity and the right to self-determination, the Rambouillet 
agreement clearly refers to Kosovo Albanians as a people.  
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Moreover, Annex 2 does not deal with the final status of Kosovo, but 
with the interim solution, as is also observed by the ICJ:  
The Court thus concludes that the object and purpose of resolution 
1244 (1999) was to establish a temporary, exceptional legal régime which, 
save to the extent that it expressly preserved it, superseded the Serbian legal 
order and which aimed at the stabilization of Kosovo, and that it was 
designed to do so on an interim basis.192 
Thus the territorial integrity requirement appears to apply to Kosovo’s 
interim status solely. Article 11(e) which refers to the political process 
aimed to determine the future status makes no mention of territorial 
integrity, on the contrary it stresses the need to take account of the 
Rambouillet agreement. The latter as has been pointed out earlier remains 
neutral in respect to Kosovo’s final status, or else it even opens the door to 
secession via the self-determination route.  
 Throughout the English text of the resolution (including its annexes) 
the term “people” is mentioned three times, and at least twice in contexts 
which would suggest that the Kosovo Albanians are addressed193, as 
distinguished from all inhabitants of Kosovo. In the same time, in the 
preamble, a phrase that appears to be directed towards all inhabitants refers 
to the “Kosovo population”.194 The French text on the other hand refers 
solely to “population” throughout the resolution.195 
 While it cannot be said with absolute certainty, that resolution 1244 
(1999) regards the Kosovo Albanians as a people with the right to self-
determination and hence to secession, it certainly cannot be claimed that it 
prohibits secession as a solution for the final status by making appeal to the 
territorial integrity of the FRY.  
The Ahtisaari Plan does not mention Kosovo’s independence, but it 
surely describes it. The Comprehensive Proposal incorporates the principles 
outlined by the Contact Group regarding multi-ethnicity and the prohibition 
on partition or union with another State or part of a State.196 There is no 
provision which could suggest a relation of subordination towards Belgrade; 
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in fact Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia are encouraged “to pursue and 
develop good neighborly relations”.197 The Plan puts forward a series of 
provisions which are clear attributes of a statal entity. Famously, it stipulates 
the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements and the right to 
seek membership in international organizations198, the right to have “its 
own, distinct, national symbols”, including a flag, seal and anthem199, and 
in language reminiscent of the Vienna Conventions on State Succession, the 
duty to take over part of the external debt of the Republic of Serbia200, 
whereas immovable and movable property of SFR or Serbia located within 
the territory of Kosovo shall pass to Kosovo.201 
Martti Ahtisaari’s recommendation for Kosovo’s final status presented 
to the Security Council on 26 March 2007 and supported by the UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon was “independence, supervised by the 
international community”.202 The “categorical, diametrically opposed 
positions of Belgrade and Pristina” – the former demanding Kosovo’s 
autonomy within Serbia, the latter demanding independence – exhausted, in 
the view of the UN Special Envoy, the potential to produce any mutually 
agreeable outcome through negotiations.203 The recommendation for 
independence is based upon:  
a history of enmity and mistrust exacerbated by oppression, systematic 
discrimination and repression of the Milošević regime during the 1990s 
the recent reality of de facto discontinued Serbian rule over Kosovo 
given the UNMIK administration 
the will of the “overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo”.204 
Martti Ahtisaari’s considerations in support of Kosovo’s 
independence are unquestionably identical to the reasoning for remedial 
secession.  
The lack of reaction of the Security Council, which did neither 
endorse the plan nor rejected it, is the consequence of disagreement amidst 
its members. The United States and the European Union (EU) members of 
the Council agreed – more or less enthusiastic – that the Ahtisaari solution 
 
197
  Id, Art. 1(10). 
198
  Id., Art. 1(5). 
199
  Id., Art. 1(7) (emphasis added). 
200
  Id., Art. 8(2). 
201
  Id., Art. 8(3). 
202
  Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's future status, 
S/2007/168 of 26 March 2007, 2. 
203
  Id. 
204
  Id., 3. 
Secession in Theory and Practice: the Case of Kosovo and Beyond 577
was the only viable one and supported a draft resolution for its 
endorsement.205 Russia, being a veto power, has remained supportive of 
Belgrade’s claim over Kosovo. The official discourse pointed to the legal 
precedent that was to be created by Kosovo’s unilateral move to 
independence. Thus, the Russian Federation’s resolution proposal is said to 
have asked for open-ended negotiations in order to allow the parties to come 
to a mutual acceptable solution.206  
In summer 2007, to break the deadlock in the Council, the Contact 
Group agreed for a troika comprising representatives of the EU, the Russian 
Federation and the United States to lead further negotiations between 
Belgrade and Pristina.207 After four months of efforts, the troika reported its 
failure to assure consensus, since “[n]either party was willing to cede its 
position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo”, however 
a commitment to non-violence was extracted.208  
4. The Republic of Kosovo 
On 17 February 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo declared Kosovo’s 
independence, accepted “the obligations for Kosovo contained in the 
Ahtisaari Plan”, welcomed “an international civilian presence to supervise 
our implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, and a European Union-led rule of 
law mission” and invited “the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to retain 
the leadership role of the international military presence in Kosovo.”209 The 
Serbian Parliament rejected Kosovo’s independence prior to its 
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proclamation and declared the planned deployment of the European Union 
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) contrary to international law. It 
also initiated an Action Plan by means of which governmental institutions 
are to make use of all legal modalities to preserve Kosovo within Serbia.210 
The position was reiterated subsequently to Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence:  
These acts represent a violent and unilateral secession of a part of the 
territory of the Republic of Serbia and this is why they are invalid and void. 
These acts do not produce any legal effect either in the Republic of Serbia 
or in the international legal order.211 
 
Russia, in the words of the Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica 
is “a firm and principled ally all the while, defending … Serbia’s right not to 
have its territory usurped”212; the Russian Federation denounced Kosovo’s 
independence as contrary to international law and as a challenge to the state 
system posed by its precedential value.213 
There is little doubt that the Declaration of Independence has received 
US blessing and was coordinated with the EU, despite the latter’s remaining 
divisions on the issue of recognition. The day preceding the Declaration of 
Independence, the Council of the European Union decided to launch the 
EULEX and to appoint the EU Special Representative for Kosovo214, both 
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mechanisms being provided for in the Ahtisaari plan.215 Most of the EU 
states, as well as the USA, have recognized the independence of Kosovo.216 
According to the view espoused by the declaratory school, an act of 
recognition does not have a constitutive effect, it simply “acknowledges as a 
fact something that has hitherto been uncertain.”217 In the same time 
however, recognition cannot occur when an entity is created in breach of 
international law.218 The recognition of Kosovo by several states could be 
interpreted as a proof of these latter states’ consideration that Kosovo’s 
independence is not the result of an illegal situation. In other words, 
potentially, that remedial secession is not prohibited under international law.  
And lastly, the ICJ has contributed in July 2010 to advising on the 
unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, but not much beyond 
that. Unsurprisingly, given the request of the General Assembly219, the 
insistence of states for confinement in interpreting the scope and meaning of 
the question220 and the record of the Court in approaching sensitive 
questions, the ICJ gave a “narrow and specific”221 interpretation of the case 
at hand. In order to respond to the question posed to it, the Court does it not 
consider necessary to answer or even touch upon either of the following: 
- The legal consequences of the declaration of independence, in 
particular “the validity or legal effects of the recognition of 
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the ground for over one year, International Crisis Group, Kosovo Countdown: A 
Blueprint for Transition (2007), 21. 
216
  The list of states which have recognized Kosovo, as well as the recognition statements 
are available online at http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ (last visited 25 August 
2010). 
217
  On the other hand, in the absence of recognition an entity is not able to enter into 
relations with other states, therefore lacking one of the traditional criteria of statehood. 
In this sense then, recognition does have a certain role to play in the process of state 
creation. J. Dugard & D. Raič, supra note 60, 96-101. 
218
  M. Kohen, supra note 18, 627. 
219
  In its 2008 resolution the General Assembly requested the Court to advise on the 
following question: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”, see 
GA Res. 63/3, 8 October 2008. 
220
  See for example the view of the USA, Written Statement, supra note 191, 41. and that 
of Germany, Statement of the Federal Republic of Germany, Verbalnote No. 54, 15 
April 2009, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15624.pdf (last visited 
25 August 2010). 
221
  As the Court considers the question to be, see Accordance with International Law of 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), supra note 6, para. 51.  
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Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as an 
independent State” or whether Kosovo has achieved statehood.222 
- Whether international law conferred a positive entitlement on 
Kosovo to declare unilaterally its independence223  
- Whether international law generally confers an entitlement on 
entities situated within a State to break unilaterally away from it, 
that is a general right to secession.224  
It finds that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate 
general international law because “the Court considers that general 
international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of 
independence”. Read together with the Court’s statement in paragraph 56, it 
is entirely possible for a particular act, such as a unilateral declaration of 
independence, not to be in violation of international law without necessarily 
constituting the exercise of a right conferred by it. 
The finding cannot be construed as implying that there is a right to 
secession for Kosovo, even less so for other secessionist movements. A 
prohibition on declaring independence is similarly not contained by Security 
Council resolution 1244. This, again, should not be understood as giving 
rise to a right to secession, since in the view of the Court the language of the 
resolution does not make any definitive determination on the final status.225 
Bluntly put, the ICJ opinion adds little to the controversy over the legal 
precedent allegedly set by Kosovo and whether this would consist in a right 
to remedial secession.226  
 
222
  Id. 
223
  Id, para. 56. 
224
  Id. 
225
  Id., para. 118; Although it goes beyond the scope of the article to offer an exhaustive 
analysis of the Court’s decision, it should be noted here that the Court introduces a 
sort of dédoublement for the Assembly of Kosovo, differentiating between this acting 
as a Provisional Institution of Self-Government in the past, as opposed to “persons 
who acted together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside 
the framework of the interim administration” while declaring independence. The later 
situation thus put the Assembly of Kosovo, or so the Court considers, outside the 
responsibility set forth by the Constitutional Framework, paras 102-109, 120-121. 
226
  The only paragraphs where the Court mentions secession are intended to decline its 
competence, as such: “[t]he Court considers that it is not necessary to resolve these 
questions in the present case” and “that issue is beyond the scope of the question 
posed by the General Assembly”. Secondly, it notes that “radically different views 
were expressed by those taking part in the proceedings and expressing a position” on 
whether the right to self-determination in its external aspects applies beyond the 
Secession in Theory and Practice: the Case of Kosovo and Beyond 581
D. Impact of Practice on Theory: the “Kosovo 
Precedent” and Beyond 
“[A]fter having worked with UN officials for eight years, the 
Kosovars’ plan can no longer be viewed as “unilateral” but rather as 
continually prepared and “the most unsurprising and predictable 
event” that South Eastern Europe has seen for generations.”227 
 
I. Kosovo’s Independence as an Act of Remedial Secession? 
In legal language, the diplomatic phrase “coordinated 
independence”228 stands for secession. Kosovo’s independence proclaimed 
in 2008 represents the separation of a part of the territory and population of 
Serbia without the consent of the latter. These are and will remain factual 
elements virtually impossible to dispute. What is called into question is the 
right of Kosovo to secede from Serbia. 
This article concludes that international law accommodates beyond 
controversy the right of an entity to secede, when the state it is part of 
explicitly acknowledges in its domestic law such a right or when it 
recognizes that its constituent peoples have the right to self-determination. 
This is not the case of Kosovo. Even arguing on the base of the 1974 
Constitution, Kosovo as a federative unit, was an autonomous province, and 
the Kosovo Albanians a narodnost without the right to self-determination. 
Part of Kosovo’s struggle throughout its 20th century history aimed precisely 
at gaining the status of republic within Yugoslavia. As it was faced with the 
break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the international community upheld 
the territorial integrity of Serbia and rejected Kosovo’s claimed right to 
secession. 
Remedial secession then remains the sole maybe-legal option. As was 
discussed, the doctrine is conspicuously divided on the issue of the 
existence of a right to remedial secession. The legal grounds for remedial 
                                                                                                                            
decolonization and occupation context and on remedial secession. Id., paras 55-56, 83 
and para. 82. 
227
  Agim Ceku, Prime Minister of UN-administered Kosovo (March 2006 - January 
2008) as quoted in ’EU prepares for early 2008 Kosovo independence’, EUObserver, 
5 December 2007. 
228
 ‘Kosovo premier mulls deadline on independence’, 15 July 2007, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/kosovo-premier-mulls-deadline-on-
independence-458096.html (last visited 25 August 2010). 
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secession are disputed but foremost the lack of practice is invoked. It is this 
perpetual debate regarding the status as de lege lata versus de lege ferenda 
which makes the Kosovo case so precious for both advocates and 
rejectionists of remedial secession. 
The second part of this article has shown that the case of Kosovo 
gathers the factual elements of remedial secession: 
 
- The Milošević regime carried out a policy of systematic 
discrimination followed by the perpetration of massive and grave 
abuses against the Kosovo Albanians.  
- The Kosovo Albanians are a cultural group within Serbia, 
concentrated and majoritarian on the territory of Kosovo. 
- The potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome 
through peaceful settlement of disputes has been exhausted. 
 
This analysis also emphasizes that the abuses of the late 1990s 
determined a shift in the position of part of the international community 
towards the Kosovo Albanians’ status. A gradual move towards elevating 
the Kosovo Albanians from a cultural minority to the status of a people has 
taken place. Despite the widespread discourse that depicts Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999) as the guarantee against secession, as has been 
shown in this article, the resolution does contain the seeds of the right to 
self-determination of the Kosovo Albanians. The most revealing evidence of 
this shift in status is to be found in the Rambouillet accords and the 
Ahtisaari plan. These documents, which linger as non-agreements between 
Kosovo and Serbia, did however gather the agreement of part of the 
international community. Lastly, states have recognized and continued to 
support Kosovo’s independence. This support appears to contradict existent 
state practice, since in the past states have recognized new state entities - 
created either as a result of secession or dissolution - only after the parent 
state consented to the separation.229 Along these lines then, state practice in 
the case of Kosovo would appear to set a precedent and crystallize remedial 
secession as a legal option for state creation. 
 
229
  See supra B.III; An Intermezzo: On State Practice and Secession; and also O. Corten, 
’Le reconnaissance prématuré du Kosovo: une violation du droit international’, Le 
Soir, 20 February 2008. 
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II. And Yet the Exceptionality Discourse! 
In order to verify the precedential value of Kosovo’s remedial 
secession it is necessary to reframe the analysis. As was discussed in the 
beginning paragraphs, an action that is novel or inconsistent with current 
practice gains precedential value if other states accept it. As was indicated, 
acquiescence and protest are the fundamental state reactions to an action, 
therefore those are of interest in the case of Kosovo.  
 Serbia, as the state with most interest in resolving the Kosovo case, 
has strongly protested against the legality of Kosovo’s secession. The 
protest’s effectiveness, clearly, cannot be discarded as a mere ‘paper 
protest’, not least given Serbia’s diplomatic actions which resulted in the 
UN General Assembly’s request for an Advisory Opinion on the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence.230 Moreover, Serbia belongs to the category 
of ‘specially affected’ states. In the North Sea Continental Shelf, the ICJ 
found that a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international 
law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an 
indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, State 
practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, 
should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the 
provision invoked.231 
Given Serbia’s protest, applying the ICJ test to the current matter 
would mean that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence did not 
set a precedent of remedial secession. However, there are two aspects that 
need to be pointed out at this stage. First, it would seem that granting to the 
parent state the status of ‘specially affected’ in a case of remedial secession 
would ironically reward and entrust the perpetrator of massive and grave 
human rights’ abuses with the possibility of blocking the remedy sought by 
its victim. Second, the framework in which the North Sea Continental Shelf 
case test was applied was very different from the Kosovo remedial secession 
case – both in terms of procedural matters and substance. On the one hand, 
remedial secession is not to be inferred as a customary rule from a purely 
conventional rule. In fact, there is no clear rule in respect to remedial 
 
230
  See for example C. Eick, ‘Protest’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Internationl 
Law (last updated July 2006), available at 
http://www.mpepil.com/app?letter=P&service=page&script=yes&page=subscriber_ar
ticle&id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e1460&recno=64& (last visited 25 August 
2010).  
231
  North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 8, para. 74. 
 GoJIL 2 (2010) 2, 531-587 584
secession, conventional or otherwise and hence the major importance of 
precedence and the legal effect of protest. On the other hand, it is submitted 
that in the case of remedial secession the notion of ‘specially affected’ does 
not do ‘sufficient justice’.232 Hence, if one accepts that massive and grave 
human rights’ abuse gives rise to the right of self-determination of the 
cultural people – a right that attaches an obligation erga omnes – one also 
has to cede that remedial secession cannot be the special concern of only 
one state or just of few but of all states. Thus, the notion of ‘specially 
affected’ would appear to be inapplicable or on the contrary universally 
applicable with all states equally affected.  
 Other states such as Russia, China, Argentina, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Slovakia and Romania protested or decided to withhold recognition. 
Regardless whether these states are genuinely concerned with the 
preservation of the current system of international rules, or attempt to avoid 
possible destabilization effects, or would like to show loyalty towards 
Serbia or realize that their human rights record vis-à-vis their own minorities 
might lead to endangering their borders following the Kosovo model, they 
all officially identify the potential of setting a legal precedent as a reason for 
protest or withholding recognition.  
 The fascination about the Kosovo case lies in the discourse of those 
states that chose to support and recognize Kosovo as an independent state. 
The United States of America through the voice of Condoleezza Rice asserts 
that: 
 
“The unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation – 
including the context of Yugoslavia's breakup, the history of ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo, and the extended 
period of UN administration – are not found elsewhere and therefore 
make Kosovo a special case. Kosovo cannot be seen as a precedent for 
any other situation in the world today.”233 
 
Along similar lines, the Foreign Ministers of the European Union 
states declared: 
 
232
  For a similar argumentation path in respect to certain international conventions see 
M.E. Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties (1985), 44.  
233
  U.S. Department of State, U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State, Washington 
D.C., 18 February 2008, http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-
english/2008/February/20080218144244dmslahrellek0.9832117.html; see also C. J. 
Borgen, supra note 97, 11.  
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“The Council […] underlines its conviction that in view of the conflict 
of the 1990s and the extended period of international administration 
under SCR 1244, Kosovo constitutes a sui generis case which does 
not call into question these principles and resolutions.”234 
 
But surely the most staggering statement is made by Kosovo itself in 
its own declaration of independence: 
 
“Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia’s non-consensual 
breakup and is not a precedent for any other situation.”235 
 
Throughout the years it sought independence from Serbia, Kosovo has 
maintained that it has the legal right to do so, yet in its proclamation of 
independence it declares its case unique, and hence without legal 
consequences. This discourse portraying Kosovo’s path to independence as 
unique has been echoed in recent years also by writings of legal scholars.236  
Unquestionably there are some specific features about the Kosovo 
case, notably the long period of international administration in a non-
colonial setting. To this author, however, the uniqueness argument appears 
logically problematic, but legally potent. Some explanations are in order. 
Excluding the possibility that another entity will ever gather similar 
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  Council of the European Union, Press Release, 2851st Council Meeting, General 
Affairs and External Relations, Brussels, 18 February 2008, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/98818.pdf 
(last visited 25 August 2010).  
235
  Kosovo Declaration of Independence, 17 February 2008, Preamble, available at 
http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635 (last visited 25 August 2010). 
236
  See for example Bing Bing Jia who enumerates the following elements which 
contribute to the singular character of Kosovo: “first, a territory in question has to be 
placed under international supervision after violent events have resulted in a physical 
split of territory of an existing State. Secondly, the root of the events may vary from 
one case to another, but always involves a minority different, in terms of ethnicity, 
culture, language or other grounds, from the majority of the State from which the 
territory in question separates. Thirdly, any hope for holding together the union of 
these two parts of the State is dashed politically.” B.B. Jia, “The Independence of 
Kosovo: A Unique Case of Secession”, 8 Chinese Journal of International Law 1 
(2009), 30. See also Daniel Thürer who observes that “Kosovo is distinct from other 
cases in important regards, notably in that the international community has 
administered Kosovo for almost ten years”, D. Thürer & T. Burri, supra note 30, para. 
43. 
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characteristics to the ones in the Kosovo case borders on premonition. As 
particular as the circumstances in the case of Kosovo may have been, 
involving grave and massive human rights’ abuses targeted at a cultural 
minority and foreign intervention to stop these abuses followed by 
international administration of the territory of the said minority, one simply 
cannot exclude the possibility that in the future a similar situation takes 
place.  
Regardless of its imprecise logic, the uniqueness discourse has 
significant legal consequences. By virtue of their recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence, the recognizing states have made a claim – albeit implicit – 
that the state entities were created not in breach of international legal 
norms.237 However, by systematically arguing that Kosovo’s remedial 
secession does not represent a precedent, the international community 
deprived this instance of practice of its precedential value and made it a 
legally insignificant act. After all, only acts that appear as articulated 
precedential situations, such as acts intended to have legal consequences can 
create or change customary international law. The Kosovo secession has 
been articulated, but as a non-precedential situation. In the end, “states are 
both subjected to international law and create and authoritatively interpret 
it.”238 And in this case, even the recognizing states have consciously and 
clearly opted not to create a general rule governing remedial secession.  
Ultimately, states have guarded the status quo and continued to act 
allergic to a right to remedial secession with set boundaries and clear 
coordinates. Given the protests expressed by those who opposed Kosovo’s 
secession and the uniqueness-and-no-precedent discourse of those who 
recognized its independence, a precedent for remedial secession cannot be 
inferred. Ironically, the consistent state practice is evidence of the absence 
of a customary right of remedial secession.239  
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  In the view of Oliver Corten by “prematurely” recognizing Kosovo third states are in 
breach of the principle of sovereignty and of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
Serbia. O. Corten, ‘Le reconnaissance prématuré du Kosovo : une violation du droit 
international’, Le Soir, 20 February 2008. 
238
  G. Nolte & H. P. Aust, ‘Equivocal Helpers- Complicit States, Mixed Messages and 
International Law’, 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2009), 27. 
239
  The recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia does not alter the situation 
in any significant way, as long as Russia continues to oppose Kosovo’s independence, 
inter alia, because of its precedential value. Perhaps, these seemingly mixed messages 
of Russia are best understood by appeal to the framework developed by Nolte and 
Aust starting from Scelle’s dédoublement fonctionnelle; see supra note 238.  
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E. Conclusion: A Missed Opportunity 
It is not the moment for naivety; states are fearful of setting a 
precedent. It is the fear of fueling nationalism, of legitimizing secessionist 
movements or of making their own cultural groups aware of the remedial 
secession option in case their minority rights are systematically refused, or 
autonomy and self-governance brutally denied. While not setting a legal 
precedent, the Kosovo precedent hysteria lingers. Claims for statehood will 
continue to be made, be they legitimate or not. The no-precedent safeguard 
will not discourage anyone.  
The consequences of not assuming the precedent are, regrettably, far 
more important. The force of remedial secession lies in its prevention 
potential - empowering minority groups to hold governments accountable to 
their international obligations. It is not an implosive weapon within the 
Westphalian system, but a non-traditional human rights mechanism. By 
presenting Kosovo as unique, the international community undermined the 
theory of remedial secession, and made states and their borders sacrosanct 
even when governments by way of their discriminatory and repressive 
actions against part of their population question their own raison d’être. It is 
a perverse implication that states will have to deal with when another unique 
Kosovo enters the international arena.  
Kosovo represents a missed opportunity of clarifying the concept of 
remedial secession: the ‘required’ threshold of abuse, the needed 
characteristics of a cultural group, the alternatives to be exhausted, the effect 
of time and democratization of the parent state on a secessionist claim, and 
not least, the question of uti possidetis iuris. Clarifying these aspects would 
have meant to offer a (more) objective yardstick for the international 
community to measure claims of secession. Today, arbitrariness prevails.  
Thirty-nine years ago, Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan. The debate 
whether Bangladesh set a precedent for a right to remedial secession 
continues. Regrettably, Kosovo is merely a Bangladeshi déjà-vu. 
 
 
